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Abstract

We revisit the relative merits of employee-based versus employer-based labor market
subsidies. While conventional analyses stress the equivalence of these approaches, we find a
modest preference for employee-based approaches. Because the population of low-wage workers
overlaps, but is not identical to, the populations of low-skill or low-income workers, simple
employer-based approaches are likely to be poorly targeted. Targeting may be improved by
identification of eligible workers, but identification itself raises the possibility of detrimental
stigma associated with the program. When combined with lower participation rates among firms
than among households, the size of employer-based subsidies needed to match the outcome of an
employee-based subsidy becomes quite large.
We review the empirical performance of major subsidy programs. We find that
employer-based programs have been characterized by low participation rates and relatively little
success. In contrast, the Earned Income Tax Credit appears relatively successful in targeting the
desired population, inducing additional labor market participation, and raising incomes.

1.

Introduction

There has been renewed interest in the topic of labor market subsidies to disadvantaged
workers. In part, this reflects widespread concern over shifts in the distribution of earnings and
income over the past two decades. At the same time, it is also driven by a reconsideration of the
goals of income-support programs, and a new federalist approach to welfare programs in the
United States.
Our purpose in this paper is to revisit one aspect of the design of these programs, namely
the use of employer-based subsidies versus employee-based subsidies. In doing so, we seek to
approach the design of labor market programs within the context of the public finance literature
on taxes and subsidies. Thus, we begin by reviewing the lessons of this literature, with the goal
of developing criteria for program design. We then turn toward the specifics of the target
populations and programs, with an eye toward evaluating the programs found in the United
States.
A central issue is the notion of a “target population”; that is, who are we trying to help?
In what follows, we treat the target population as individuals from low-income families, a choice
that does not coincide with either the population of low-wage workers or the population of lowskilled individuals. However, because wages are an important component of income and because
skill levels determine wages, these populations overlap considerably. But, as we show below,
these three groups are not perfectly interchangeable and the need to distinguish among them
forms the basis for some of our conclusions.

To anticipate the bottom line, we find a modest preference for employee-based approaches.
Simple employer-based approaches are unlikely to be well-targeted because low-wage workers
are not necessarily either low-skill or low-income. Improved targeting requires identification of
workers from low-income families. This identification comes at the expense of stigmatizing the
workers, and seems to produce extremely low participation rates among firms. By our
calculations, the size of employer-based subsidies needed to match the outcome of an employeebased subsidy becomes quite large. In practice, these considerations appear to be quite
important. We find that employer-based programs have been characterized by low participation
rates and relatively little success. In contrast, an employee-based approach such as the Earned
Income Tax Credit appears relatively successful in targeting the desired population, inducing
additional labor market participation, and raising incomes.

2.

Analytic Framework

2.1

Basics
No discussion of labor market subsidies is complete without revisiting the basic supply

and demand framework shown in Figure 1. In the diagram, l d (w) denotes the demand for lowskill labor and l s (w) denotes the supply of low-skilled labor. The equilibrium quantity of labor

(l* ) and the equilibrium wage (w*) are determined by their intersection.
Consider the introduction of a subsidy to employers of low-skill workers taking the form
of a tax credit at the rate of c per dollar of wage payments to these workers. As shown in the
figure, this produces three important effects. First, the demand for labor shifts outward; at each
level of wage payments to workers, the effective cost to firms falls. Second, the equilibrium
quantity of labor used rises to l ′. Finally, the market wage rises to w′ at the same time the cost

to employers falls to (1-c)w′ . In effect, the workers capture a wage increase equal to w′-w*,
while employers benefit from a decline in wages equal to w*-(1-c)w′.
Of course, in this simple setting, it is equally possible to represent a subsidy given
directly to workers; in this case taking the form of a tax credit equal to e per dollar of wage
earnings. Again, the subsidy produces three effects. First, the supply curve for labor shifts
outward; at each wage, w, offered by firms the workers receives a total of (1 + e )w , leading to
greater labor supply. Second, the equilibrium quantity of labor rises to l ′′ . Finally, the cost to
firms (the market wage) falls to w′′ , while the wage cum subsidy for workers rises to (1 + e )w′′ .
The most important lesson from the basic framework is that for equivalent subsidies
(those where e=c/(1-c)), the impact of the employer-based subsidy and the impact of the
employee-based subsidy is identical. That is, l′ = l ′′, (1 − c)w′ = w′′, and w′ = (1 + e)w′′ . In this
textbook setting, the economic incidence of the subsidy program does not depend upon the
statutory provisions surrounding its implementation. Instead, only market fundamentals—supply
and demand elasticities—are crucial to the outcome.
From the standpoint of policy, there are two important implications of this equivalence.
First, ex post, the evaluation of the program must acknowledge the economic repercussions.
Since payments to employers will help workers just as much (or little) as direct payments to the
individuals, we cannot rely simply on the size and recipient of subsidy payments to decide the
impacts.
Second, because the economic benefits will be determined by market fundamentals, the
administrative structure of the program may be chosen to minimize the difficulties of
implementation. That is, the administrative structure of the program and distributional objectives
are not linked in this simple framework.

For purposes of the remainder, it is useful to pursue this example further. Notice that
under the employer-based subsidy, workers gain labor income equal to w′l ′ − w * l * , which
consists of two parts: w′l ′ − w * l* ≡ (w′ − w*)l * +w′(l ′ − l*) . The first component represents
the wage gains of the labor already employed when the subsidy is instituted, while the latter part
shows the income accounted for by new labor at the new (higher) wage. (As noted earlier, the
same economic impact would accrue under the employee-base program where the components
are (w′′(1 + e ) − w* )l* and w′′(1 + e)(l ′ − l*) , respectively.)
The equivalence of employer- and employee-based programs require that the “existing”
and “new” labor supply be the same—respond the same to market incentives, enter identically in
program objectives, and be otherwise interchangeable.
We turn now to those situations where this may not be the case.
2.2

Extensions and Issues
The basic framework is ideal for making the point that net economic benefits have

nothing to do with administrative practices in a simple setting. However, in turning from
textbooks to actual programs, the framework raises as many questions as it resolves. In
particular:
Objectives of Subsidy Programs.

What is the purpose of a wage-subsidy

program? Observation suggests (at least) three possible answers.1 One could pose the design
issue from the perspective of optimal tax theory. In that approach, the goal is to choose a subsidy
(tax) so as to maximize social welfare subject to a restriction on the total size of government
outlays. In designing the program, the degree to which the subsidy permits the policy maker to
meet the distributional objectives would count as social benefits. However, at the same time, the
deadweight costs stemming from distorted economic decisions (especially labor supply) would
reduce social welfare. Accordingly, a key part of the optimal policy framework is the primacy

placed on individuals’ preferences and the utility loss due to distortions of their decisions. To
see the point in the context of Figure 1, note that the wage subsidy increases labor usage from l *
to l ′ . However, for each unit of labor utilized beyond l * the disutility incurred by workers (as
measured by the wage necessary to induce supply, or height of the supply curve) exceeds the
value of the corresponding output (as measured by the height of the demand curve). In the broad
scope of affairs, the subsidy programs induces a socially inefficient mix of too much work (too
little leisure) and too much consumption.
But introspection alone indicates that “workfare” and related programs are borne of the
idea that individuals should work more; i.e., that their decisions to not work (at current wages,
etc.) are not respected by the policymaker. If so, the optimal tax approach of balancing
distributive goals against labor supply distributions simply makes no sense. Thus, a second
approach would be to focus on the labor supply effects, but in a paternal and normative way:
people should work, additional work is not a “bad” distortion, and the goal of the program is to
expand employment per se. Focusing on generating new employment may have a large impact
on program design. For example, in an effort to get the greatest “bang for the buck” policy
makers may attempt to focus subsidies only on new hires. To the extent that subsidies are
intended to be received only by marginal net expansions of employment, it leads to an emphasis
on employer-based approaches where it is easier to document and track the quantity of labor.
In other policy contexts, a similar focus on the changing “quantities” without regard to
the welfare or deadweight loss implications, leads to a non-linear structure very different from
the basic subsidy. For example, in the literature on saving incentives, Bernheim and Scholz
(1993) propose a subsidy for saving (tax-exemption of the return) for saving above a minimum
threshold. In our context, this approach would manifest itself by having participants qualify for

benefits only if they work in excess of a minimum standard.2 In this way, an approach focusing
on quantities can lead to programs structured very differently than the traditional subsidy.
The final way in which such programs are typically evaluated is strictly on their
distributional effects. That is, the program is viewed as a success if it either (a) raises the wage
rates paid to the target population, or (b) raises the incomes of these individuals, without explicit
weight being given to the distortions introduced by the program. Moving to the “distributional”
approach places an emphasis on both prices and quantities; the goal is to raise earnings. In this
setting, employee-based subsidies are easier to implement because the policy maker is not
required to monitor separately jobs, hours, and wage rates.
How, then, should one proceed? In what follows, we focus on the latter approach and
concentrate on the income-distributional effects of the subsidy-design problem. Programs should
not be egregiously distortionary, of course. But we believe the primary objective of subsidy
programs is to raise the incomes of participants. One consequence of the tactic is to orient the
discussion around the incomes of workers, which may derive from multiple employers or in part
from other members of the household. In this way, it shifts the weight of preference toward
employee-based programs.
Information and Targeting.

The basic framework is built upon complete

information. There is a target population that is identified perfectly to policymakers. Firms are
aware of the target population and can calculate the supply of these workers to their firm and the
impact of the subsidy on the wage. Similarly, individuals know that they are members (or not) of
the target population, can calculate the impact of the program on their net pay, and can identify
firms that are participants in the program. In short, it is possible to draw the supply curve,
demand curve, compute the intersection, and evaluate the outcome.

In practice, it can be quite challenging to identify members of the target population. To
get a sense of the difficulty, consider the information in Tables 1 and 2, which is based on a 1994
sample of households from the 1994 calendar year in the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). The main message of Tables 1 and 2 is that it is a mistake to utilize the
terms “low-wage,” “low-skill,” and “poor” interchangeably. 3
From Table 1 we begin by highlighting that low-wage and poor are not the same. We
define a low-wage worker as someone whose average annual wage is below $5.93, which marks
the lowest quintile of the wage distribution.4 We define poor as pre-tax and pre-transfer
household income below the poverty line for the household size. Using these definitions, only
15.0 percent of the households with low-wage workers are poor. The mean annual, pre-transfer
income of families with a low-wage earner is $37,650 compared to $5,654 for poor households.
(Using a different measure of central tendency, the median for low-wage earners is $31,402
versus $5,304 for the poor.) These dramatic differences in economic status derive from large
differences in labor force participation—households with a low-wage worker have an average of
2.1 workers, versus only 0.5 for poor households.
Demographic differences explain some of the difference in the rate of employment. In
particular, households with a low-wage worker are much less likely to be headed by a single
female (9.6 percent versus 23.0 percent) than poor households. This leads one to suspect that
low-wage workers may often be secondary earners in relatively well-off households, and not
necessarily the intended targets of wage subsidy programs. Table 2 explores this hypothesis by
highlighting the differences between low wage individuals and poor individuals. The average
share of total income contributed by a low-wage worker to total household income ($6,028 to
$38,384) is substantially below the contribution of a worker in a poor family ($6,197 to $9,431).
Compared to workers in poor families, low-wage workers are more likely to be teenagers (18.7

percent versus 10.7 percent). Low-wage workers have slightly higher levels of education (11.5
years versus 11.2 years) and are more likely to be white than poor workers (82.5 percent vs. 67.9
percent), suggesting that they have somewhat higher labor market opportunities than the poor
workers.
Table 2 also shows that targeting “low-skilled” workers is not the same as targeting “lowwage” or “poor” workers where low-skilled is defined as having less than a high-school
education. In many ways, the low-skilled workers are neither low-wage nor poor. Only 11
percent of the low-skilled workers are poor and the low-skilled workers on average earn higher
wages ($7.31) than either low-wage workers on average ($4.02) or poor workers ($5.60).
However, the earnings of low-skilled workers contribute a larger share to the total household
income than the earnings of low-wage workers, suggesting that low-skilled workers are not as
likely to be secondary wage earners.
Finally, recall that most of the poor individuals are not working. One reason is that 33.4
percent of the non-working poor are elderly. These individuals may be “poor” only by our
definition of pre-tax and transfer income. Moreover, they are unlikely to be the main
beneficiaries of labor-market-based policies.
These computations are intended to be illustrative. Even so, they indicate that
subsidizing based on observable characteristics such as education or wage rates does not
guarantee a well-targeted program. Because low-wage employees, low-skilled employees, and
individuals in poor households are not the same people, an employer-based subsidy to low-wage
workers will not be equivalent to an employee-based subsidy to poor households. Most
importantly, a subsidy to all low-wage employees would likely encompass secondary earners in
non-poverty households, the working elderly (who may have substantial assets), and a myriad of
other configurations of skills and incomes that result in a program that is not well-targeted. 5

A prominent recent example of the employer-based approach is that of Phelps (1997). He
proposes a comprehensive employer-based subsidy to “reward employment of workers in
eligible, low-wage jobs” (p. 106), an approach intended to relieve the unemployment and
concomitant social ills of low-income households. But the cautionary lesson of Tables 1 and 2 is
that the adopted solution may not fit the diagnosed problem.
But could the employer-based approach be better-targeted? One way to circumvent the
non-equivalence of low-wage and poor workers is to require that individuals identify themselves
to firms participating in an employee-based program. Unfortunately, to do so raises the specter
of a stigma associated with being part of the targeted population (Moffitt, 1983). Stigma is more
than a theoretical possibility, as a number of experiments have shown that requiring members of
the target group to identify themselves to potential employers results in substantially worse
outcomes compared to when the target group does not identify themselves. (See Burtless 1985;
Dubin and Rivers 1993; and Hollenbecke and Wilke 1991.)
Thus, issues in targeting raise substantial questions regarding the efficiency of an
employer-based approach. The issues of stigma-inducing information flaws are compounded by
the fact that a large portion of the poor population is not in the labor force at all, a topic to which
we now turn.
Extensive versus Intensive Margins.

The basic framework does not distinguish

between movements in the quantity of labor that occur due to the hiring of more workers and
those movements that result from the supply of more labor per worker. As a practical matter, the
two are far from equivalent.
From the employer’s perspective, demand is likely more elastic with respect to overtime
and other intensive adjustments than with respect to new hiring, where fixed costs of hiring and
training are more prominent. At the other end of the market, the empirical record indicates that

labor force participation, retirement, and other “extensive” adjustments are more elastically
responsive than are variations in hours per worker.
As a result, programs that subsidize hours are more likely to have an economic incidence
residing on existing workers (inelastic supply; elastic demand), while subsidies to (new) workers
may lean toward incidence benefiting firms (more elastic supply; inelastic demand). This raises a
design dilemma. To the extent that the targeted workers are already employed, the hours subsidy
appears preferable, because the economic benefits will tend to accrue to workers. Also, it is
more easily implemented as an employer-based subsidy (where monitoring of hours is easier).
However, as we saw in Tables 1 and 2, most poor individuals are not working. To the extent that
the target population is not already employed, it will be preferable to induce hiring at the
extensive margin. Unfortunately, the economic benefit of this subsidy is more likely to accrue to
firms.6
Administrative/Compliance Costs.

The basic framework ignores monetary and

non-monetary costs to firms and households for participating in the program. Clearly,
administrative costs and participation costs must be considered. The best policy will minimize
efficiency costs plus overhead costs while meeting its distributional goal, leading to the potential
for a tradeoff between being well-targeted programs with high administrative costs and those
which are “cheap” to run, but spread benefits too widely.
A particularly important form of such costs are information costs. To the extent that the
most important margin of adjustment is the entry and employment of new workers into the labor
force, there may be important asymmetries in information. That is, households may be unaware
of employer-based subsidies, thereby requiring firms to incur significant recruitment or other
“advertising” costs to pursue hiring that is (otherwise) in their economic interest. However,

similar considerations appear far less important in employee-based programs, contributing less to
overall participation costs incurred by the household.
Cash versus In-Kind Subsidies.

The basic framework focuses on cash subsidies

that raise the net wage to workers. In practice, there is considerable attention paid to the
provision of non-cash subsidies to work, especially the provision of health insurance and child
care. Recent evidence (see, for example, Gruber (1994)) suggests that non-cash subsidies are
capitalized into wages on a dollar-for-dollar basis. At the conceptual level, at least, this permits
us to treat cash and non-cash subsidies in the same way.7
2.3

An Expanded Framework
To guide the remainder of the discussion we expand slightly on the basic framework to

incorporate several of the features noted above. Given the wide variety of issues, it is unlikely
that any single model will clearly explain the choice between employer-based and employeebased approaches to the problem. Nevertheless, it seems useful to adopt a structure for the issue,
at least to provide some guidance into categorizing the features of extant programs. First, we
address the fact that participation in subsidy programs is voluntary. Thus, both firms and
workers must have economic incentives to be involved in the subsidy program. Second, we
incorporate the notion of compliance and/or participation costs explicitly in our discussion of the
programs.
To begin, return to an employer-based subsidy. For simplicity, assume that the subsidy
takes the form of a credit at the rate c per dollar of wage payments to the targeted workers. This
has the immediate effect of lowering the employers’ cost of labor from w to w(1-c), where w
denotes the wage paid to workers.8 In contrast to the basic framework, however, there are further
effects.

First, to the extent that being identified with the targeted population is associated with
stigma, the need to identify the recipients acts to inhibit the supply of this type of labor. In the
context of the diagram, there is an upward shift in the supply curve because the effective wage
received (at any levels of labor supply) falls to w/(1+s)where s is the “wage-equivalent” rate of
stigma. Put simply, it is the percentage decline in the wage as a result of the need to associate
with the program. The net effect of the subsidy cum stigma is to change the cost of labor to the
firm from w to w(1-c)(1+s). Obviously, unless c exceeds s/(1+s), there is no effective subsidy as
a result of the program.
Assuming that c is sufficiently large, the outward shift in demand exceeds the shift
backward in supply, the quantity of labor rises from l b (“before”) to l a (“after”). As shown in
Figure 2, this is associated with a rise in the wage payment to workers from w to w′ (which is, in
turn, valued by workers at w′ / (1 + s ) . From the perspective of firms the cost of labor falls from
w to w′(1 − c) .
Will firms participate? If the fixed costs of running the program are F, then the firm will
net an economic advantage if

∫

la
lb

[ MPl − w′(1 − c )]dl + [ w − (1 − c )w′ ]l b ≥ F .

(1)

That is, the sum of the surplus on new labor plus the cost-saving on extant workers must exceed
the fixed costs. Clearly, firms with low labor productivity and/or high fixed costs will be less
likely to participate. To further clarify, assume that MPl = w —i.e., that we are operating in the
region of the initial equilibrium. If so, this reduces to
[w − (1 − c)w′]l a ≥ F or w − (1- c)w′ ≥

F
.
la

(2)

A firm will participate if the wage-saving per worker exceeds the fixed costs per worker. The
likelihood of participating will rise with the size of the subsidy (c), and will decline as the fixed

costs (F) decline. Recall that w′ is valued at w′ / (1+ s ) so that the larger is s the lower is the
likelihood that the firm will participate.
For comparison, let us turn now to an employee-based system. Individuals choose their
participation based on the utility function U(C,L-h) where C is consumption, L is the endowment
of leisure, and h is labor supply. If the program consists of an earnings credit at a rate e, and A is
non-labor income, then in the absence of the program the individual will have consumption of
cb = whb + A .

(3)

In contrast, in the presence of the program it will be given by
cb = w′′(1 + e)ha + A

(4)

where w′′ is the wage paid by firms. The individual will participate if the utility gain is
sufficient to outweigh the fixed compliance costs, G (measured in utility terms) of the program.
That is, if
U (w′′(1 + e)ha + A, L − ha ) − G − U (whb + A, L − hb ) ≥ 0

(5)

To gain a better feel for the decision, we can linearize around the no-program level of utility,
yielding
U (w(1 + e)ha + A, L − ha ) ≈ U (whb + A, L − hb ) + U C {w′′(1 + e)ha − whb } − U L {ha − hb } .

(6)

Thus, an individual will participate if:

w′′(1 + e)ha − whb −

UL
(ha − hb ) − G ≥ 0
UC
UC

Note that if the individual is supplying labor in the absence of the program U L /U C is equal to
the wage. However, if the individual is not participating (as would likely be the case for the
target population) this equals the reservation wage, w*, needed to induce participation. If, as
before, we examine the participation decision in the vicinity of w* = w , the individual will
participate if

(7)

[w′′(1 + e) − w* ]ha ≥

G
G
or [w′′(1 + e) − w* ] ≥
.
UC
U c ha

(8)

As with firms, individuals will participate if the wage incentives (in this case increases) are
sufficient to outweigh the fixed costs per unit. Examining this condition more closely, it is
apparent that individuals with higher reservation wages (e.g., single mothers or others with a high
value of leisure) will be less likely to participate. It follows that individuals will be more likely
to participate in the program as their reservation wage falls, or as the subsidy rate rises.
Similarly, as the complexity (as measured by G) or other overhead aspects of the program
become smaller, individuals will be more likely to participate.
Equivalence Revisited.

Are the employer- and employee-based approaches still

equivalent? With the added detail, this appears far less likely. For the program to be equivalent,
they must induce equal changes in the labor market. Specifically, if Nf is the number of firms
and p is the probability that a firm participates, the post-subsidy labor demand under the firm
program is given by pN f l a . Similarly, if r is the fraction of individuals who participate out of
the Nh households, the post-program employment is rN h ha . Thus, we require
p( F ,c,s )N f l a = r( G,e )N h ha

(9)

where we show the dependence of p and r on the structure of the programs. In turn, l a and ha
depend upon the elasticities of labor demand and supply (respectively) and the fall (rise) in the
net wage facing firms (households).
There are many dimensions along which this equivalency may break down. First, the
employee-based approach does not raise the possibility of supply-inhibiting stigma from forcing
workers to identify themselves as, for example, welfare recipients. Second, the determinants of
firms’ participation in the low-wage subsidy program (productivity, administrative costs) are not

mirrored by the determinants of individuals’ participation in the employee-based subsidy
program (reservation wages, complexity) leading to differences in p and r.
We can add a little analytic detail to this introspection. Assume for the moment that p(F,
^

^

^

c, s) and r(G, e) are constants and recognize that ha = (1 + h)hb and l a = (1 + l )l b , where h and
^

l are percentage changes in labor demand and supply, respectively. In turn, recognize that

changes in the quantity of labor derive from changes in wages induced by the program parameter.
That is:
d

^

l=

d

s

−

(c − s ), h =
s

d

^

d

−

s
s

(e)

(10)

ZKHUH dLVWKHZDJHHODVWLFLW\RIGHPDQGDQG s is the wage elasticity of supply. Finally, note
that N f l b = N h hb if the labor market is initially in equilibrium and collect terms to yield
⎛ c−s
⎛ c
 = r⎜⎜1 + 
p⎜⎜1 +
⎝

⎝


(11)

where
=

d

−
d

s
s

.

As a final step, we can rearrange equation (11) to highlight the relationship between equivalentoutcome employer-based subsidies and employee-based subsidies. Specifically:
⎛r
c = s + ⎜⎜ e +
⎝ p

⎛r

⎜⎜ − 1
⎝p 

(12)

The expression in (12) has several implications for the design of a subsidy program.
Notice first that for any given size of employee-based subsidy (e) the presence of stigma effects
(s) directly raises the size of the employer subsidy necessary to have equivalent effects. Second,
note that if participation by workers in the employee-based program exceeds that by firms in the
employer-based program, then (r/p) > 1 and c must exceed e, ceteris paribus. Essentially, even if

there is no change in behavior lower (relative) participation necessitates a higher rate of subsidy
to achieve the same outcome.
If the supply and demand curves are perfectly inelastic (

d

=

8

= 0 ), this is the entire

story. However, if the supply and demand curves are not perfectly inelastic, the differential take
up rates influence the differential in c and e in a second way. Specifically, noting that

≥ 0 , if

(r / p) > 1 this raises the employer subsidy necessary to generate the equivalent effect of a given
employee subsidy.
Finally, consider the magnitude of these effects. For modestly elastic demand
(

d

= −1.1 ) and inelastic supply (

s

= 0.6  LVURXJKO\˘,Ir = p, this has no impact.

However, as noted below, experience suggests r > p and, perhaps, dramatically so. If r = 0.85
and p = 0.80, then the employer-equivalent subsidy for e = 0.10 is c = 0.26. That is, the
employer-based subsidy must be 2.5 times greater. Empirical evidence indicates an even greater
disparity between r and p, making the size of an effective employer credit prohibitively large.
2.4

General Equilibrium Caveats
Even our expanded framework is cast entirely in a partial equilibrium setting. From a

policy design perspective, this raises two issues. First, it may lead to misleading inferences
regarding the economic incidence of subsidies. Viewed from an economy-wide perspective,
firm-based subsidies to low-wage workers affect only those low-wage workers do not employed
in participating firms. As is well known from the work of Harberger (1962), there are
circumstances in which the incidence of such a “partial factor tax” (subsidy) may be shifted to
alternative factors (for example, capital or high-wage workers). Specifically, if the subsidized
sector (participating firms) expands dramatically and uses the non-subsidized factors intensively
enough, the return to non-subsidized factors may rise relative to the low-wage workers.

Even if the incidence resides with workers, it is spread across all workers; not just those
in the subsidized sector. Thus, while the characteristics of the program may affect the number of
participating firms, and thus the size of the subsidy, the economics indicate that workers benefit
as a whole.9
The second lesson from general equilibrium settings is the role of distorting subsidies or
taxes in optimal program design. Ceteris paribus, the basic moral is that one should avoid the
use of production-distorting taxes on factors. That is, one should choose policies to leave
production undistorted (thereby maximizing output) and achieve distributional objectives
through either explicit (lump-sum if possible) transfers or carefully chosen commodity taxes.
Notice that this dictum derives from a framework in which policies respect the preferences of
individuals and seek to minimize deadweight loss.
More recent research (see, Naito (1998)) indicates that even in this setting if it is not
possible to costlessly identify the recipients of income support, then it may be useful to provide
production subsidies to meet distributional objectives. Specifically, it may be optimal to
supplement a redistributive tax system (in our setting an employee-based system) with subsidies
to the production of goods in which the target population is intensively employed. Notice that in
our context, this implies that an employee-based earnings subsidy system would be coupled with
a subsidy to the employers of low-skill workers, but that the subsidy would not be tied to the use
of low-skilled workers per se.

3.

Characteristics of Subsidy Programs: A Selective Survey

Current wage subsidy policies take many forms in their goal of making work pay. Most
employee-based wage subsidies, including the federal and state Earned Income Tax Credits
(EITCs), target low-income families. Because these programs are administered through the

income tax system, identifying low-income families is relatively easy. Not surprisingly,
employer-based wage subsidies are more highly targeted. They specifically target individuals
who are at risk for long term labor force detachment into the labor force, which may result in the
participants being stigmatized. For example, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) and
several state income tax programs limit the credit to employers hiring welfare recipients or
unemployed individuals. Many states use wage subsidies in their welfare reform initiatives
following the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996, which
placed strict requirements on states to move their welfare populations into the labor force. The
states use employer-based “grant diversion,” in which the AFDC and food stamp benefits of a
former welfare recipient are paid to the participant’s employer in the form of a subsidy. In these
cases, the wage subsidies are part of broader policies that often include job placement,
mentoring, and subsidies for work expenses, health care and child care.
This section describes a sample of existing employee- and employer-based wage and
earnings subsidies in the United States.10 We describe their characteristics within the framework
of our model - highlighting characteristics that distinguish employee- from employer-based
subsidies. Many other countries currently have wage subsidy programs; unfortunately, a
comprehensive discussion of these programs is beyond the scope of the paper.11
3.1

Employee-Based Approaches
Earned Income Tax Credit.

The EITC is the major employee based earnings

subsidy. The EITC is a refundable income tax credit targeted primarily at low-income families.
A tax-unit’s credit increases with earnings until it reaches a maximum. Over a range of income,
taxpayers receive the maximum credit, and then the credit is phased out with additional income
above a certain amount (See Table 3 for the current parameters of all programs discussed in this
section). The refundable credit is paid most frequently as a lump sum in a tax return.12 Childless

taxpayers are only eligible if they are between ages 25 and 65 and benefits are substantially lower
than for families with children, but there are no additional categorical requirements for eligibility.
In addition to the federal EITC, ten states have earned income tax credits: Iowa, Kansas,
Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Wisconsin (Johnson and Lazere, 1998). These states calculate their credits as some percentage
of the federal EITC. The EITC is non-refundable in three of these states, making it less welltargeted toward low-income families.
One of the key parameters in our extended model is the participation rate in each type of
program. Using 1990 data, a time during which the EITC was much smaller than its current
level, Scholz (1994) finds that approximately 85 percent of those eligible for the EITC received it
in 1990.13 This participation rate is well above other income transfer programs such as Food
Stamps or the former Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
Participation rates may be high because there is no stigma attached to participation.
Employees simply claim the EITC by filing personal income taxes and their employers need not
know their family income status. Low participation costs may also contribute to these
participation rates. For families that file taxes, the Internal Revenue Service will calculate their
EITC.
The low costs of filing have historically been accompanied by a high rate of
noncompliance.14 A 1997 report of the Internal Revenue Service (1997) estimated that 26
percent of EITC dollars were overclaimed in 1994—a substantial improvement from the 1988
estimates. The primary source of error is taxpayers claiming children who did not live with them
for more than half the year (Scholz, 1997).
Earlier we argued that it is easier to target the low-income population with an employee
based age subsidy. The EITC is based on the income of the tax unit, which is typically the

family—this avoids subsidizing low wage workers in high income families. The age restriction
for childless taxpayers guarantees that teenagers and elderly, who are likely to be secondary
earners, are not eligible for the credit. There is some evidence that the EITC is well-targeted at
demographic groups who are thought to be at risk for long term labor force detachment. For
example, estimates in the early 1990s suggest that the between 47 and 60 percent of eligible
participants were single mothers (Eissa and Leibman, 1996 and Whitehouse, 1996).
The EITC is not well-targeted in one obvious way. To minimize labor supply
disincentives, the breakeven income of the EITC is above the poverty line, so many nonpoor
families receive the EITC. Assuming that the EITC does not cause any behavioral changes,
Liebman (1998) estimates that under 1996 EITC rules, 80 percent of households with income
between 100 percent and 150 percent of the poverty line receive the EITC; however, very few
EITC dollars go to taxpayers with incomes more than 200 percent of the poverty line. Scholz
(1994) estimated that approximately 50 percent of the EITC payments in 1996 would go to
families that are not poor.
There are at least three additional ways in which the EITC may not be well-targeted.
First, the credit is based on family earnings rather than wages, so it is possible that the credit is
subsidizing high-skilled individuals who work few hours. Secondly, Wiseman (1995) argues that
the EITC is not well-targeted at very low-income households who are liquidity constrained,
because it is most frequently paid in a lump sum at the end of a year. For these families, the
monthly welfare payments are more attractive than subsidized work. Similarly, if a family’s
income is sufficiently low, they are not required to file income taxes and they may not receive the
EITC because they unaware of the benefits of filing taxes. Finally, if the household unit is
different than the income tax unit (legal spouse and dependents), the EITC may be subsiding
families who are not in low-income households. This may be particularly relevant for unmarried,

cohabiting couples whose joint income would make them ineligible for the EITC if they were to
marry.
The structure of the EITC highlights many points in our discussion about the design
dilemma over the intensive and extensive margins. Theoretically, the credit has an
unambiguously positive effect on labor force participation for families that are not in the labor
force and this prediction is supported in empirical research. For example, Dickert, Houser and
Scholz (1995), estimate that the EITC expansion between 1993 and 1996 would increase the
increases wages of single parents by 15 percent and increase the probability of working by 5.6
percentage points. Eissa and Leibman (1996) estimate that the labor force participation of single
mothers increased 2.8 percentage points relative to the labor force participation of women
without children (who were ineligible for the EITC) following the expansion of the EITC in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. More recently, Meyers and Rosenbaum (1998) find that the EITC
explains 39 percent of the increase in the labor force participation rate of single mothers between
1984 and 1996. Thus, to the extent that the important dimension of labor supply is the decision
to work at all, the EITC appears well-suited to meet the subsidy objectives.
However, the predicted labor supply effects of the EITC on the intensive margin are more
ambiguous. In the subsidy range of the credit, the substitution effect provides incentive for
individuals to increase labor supply but the income effect provides incentive to decrease labor
supply. For taxpayers in the flat range of the credit, the income effect provides an unambiguous
incentive to decrease labor supply and for taxpayers in the phase out range of the credit, the
substitution and income effects will work together to discourage labor supply. Secondary earners
have large incentives for lowering their hours or exiting the labor force because their earnings
would place the family in the EITC’s phase-out range or leave the family ineligible for the EITC.
In summary, the EITC is not well-designed for increasing hours worked.

For the most part, the predictions are upheld in the empirical literature. Based on labor
supply elasticities from existing literature, Dickert, Houser, and Scholz (1995) show that labor
market participants, especially secondary wage earners, are likely to decrease their hours as a
result of an expanded EITC. They also show that the EITC is likely to induce secondary earners
to drop out of the labor force. Eissa and Hoynes (1998) find that the EITC expansion lowered
the labor force participation rate of married women and reduced the hours worked by married
men and especially women. They estimate that overall, family labor supply fell as a result of the
EITC expansions. One exception to these findings is Eissa and Leibman (1996), who find that
the expansion of the EITC after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had little effect on hours worked for
single parents. The bottom line is that the EITC is best suited to induce labor force participation
of non-working individuals.
We are left with the question of the distributional impacts of the EITC. Ignoring any
behavioral responses to the EITC, the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (1998) shows that
the EITC moved 4.6 million people, including 2.4 million children, out of poverty in 1996. This
accounts for 8 percent of the pre-transfer poor (14.5 percent of the pre-transfer poor children).
Liebman (1998) estimates that the EITC offsets 12 percent of the total poverty gap for
households with children.
Our earlier discussion suggests that ignoring behavioral responses may be inappropriate,
because individuals can actually increase their income while working less. Eissa and Liebman
(1996) finding that single women did not change their hours in response to an expansion of the
EITC suggests that earnings of those in the labor force increased. Eissa and Hoynes (1998) find
that on average the expansions in the EITC beginning in 1986 increased income by an average of
$828 for married couples, 10 percent lower than if there were no changes in labor force
participation. However, they note that this is an upper bound because it does not account for the

reduction in hours worked by taxpayers who remain in the labor force, which are quite large for
some categories of individuals.
New Hope Project.

One small-scale employee-based wage subsidy that has received

national media attention is the New Hope Project in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. This non-profit
organization funded by national, state, and local organizations began in 1994 (Brock et. al.,
1997). Individuals are eligible if they reside in targeted neighborhoods in Milwaukee, their
income is below 150 percent of the poverty line, and they are willing to work 30 hours a week.
The program provides a monthly earnings subsidy when the participants’ earnings, combined
with the federal and state earned income credits, are below the poverty line.15 This program also
subsidizes child care and health insurance for participants and provides job search services.
Participants in the New Hope project can choose to utilize any of the services individually or
together. Empirical research on the program’s effectiveness is underway.
3.2

Employer-Based Approaches
Income Tax-Based Subsidies.

There are currently two federal employer-based

wage subsidy programs: the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) and the Welfare to Work
Tax Credit (WTWTC). Some states, including Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, in addition to the District of Columbia, also offer tax credits
for hiring targeted populations. The credits pay a fraction of wages up to a maximum.
Maryland’s tax credit is a special case as it also provides a credit for expenses incurred by the
employer for child-care expenses that enable the employee to be hired (Maryland Comptroller of
the Treasury, 1998).
Administered through the tax system, the targeted populations include populations at risk
for long-term labor force detachment such as, welfare recipients, at-risk youths, ex-felons and
veterans. The federal credits are available to firms who hire members of these targeted groups

within a specified time range. This time restriction, along with a requirement that the employees
cannot be rehires, attempts to limit the subsidy to marginal hires.
These income-tax credits have very strict compliance requirements. Employers must
begin to certify the eligibility of the employee by the day the individual begins work and have
completed the process by the 21st day after the individual begins work (Internal Revenue Service,
1998a and 1998b). Eligibility is often dependent on the employee being paid some minimum
wage and working a minimum number of hours. In addition, both the federal and state programs
limit the time a firm can claim the same employee - typically to one or two years.
The current incarnations of the income-tax employer-based wage subsidies are too recent
to evaluate their effectiveness. However, the designs of the current subsidies are similar to the
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC), which was in place between 1978 and 1997. We base our
discussion primarily on Katz’s (1996) thorough review of this program.
A striking feature of the TJTC is the particularly low participation rate—in fact, estimates
of the participation rate in the TJTC are all below 10 percent. For example, Katz (1996)
estimates that in the mid to late 1980s, approximately only 9 percent of the eligible that were
hired were ever claimed and Lerman (1982) estimates that fewer than four percent were claimed
through 1980.
Two explanations for the discouragingly low participation rates have been offered in the
literature. First, to claim the credit, the employer has to know the employee is a member of the
target group and, as we showed in our model, this identification may cause stigma and lower
program participation. This hypothesis is supported by the experiments we mentioned earlier.
With respect to the TJTC, Bishop and Kang (1991) found that many employers cited the
anticipated low quality or skill of the targeted group members as a reason for not recruiting

among this group. These issues do not arise in the EITC when employers do not have the same
level of information about their low-wage employees.
Strict compliance requirements are second explanation for the low participation rates in
the TJTC. Our model also suggests that high compliance costs result in low participation and
this is supported by the TJTC experience. For example, Katz (1996) notes that many of the firms
who participated in the TJTC were large firms who could afford the fixed cost of contracting
with management assistance companies to review and certify the eligibility of potential
employees.
Because the existing employee-based wage subsidies require employees to identify
themselves as members of the targeted group and because the compliance costs are similar to
those in the TJTC, we hypothesize that current wage subsidies will also be plagued by very low
participation rates.
One obvious benefit of requiring employees to be members of a categorical group is that
the TJTC and its current counterparts are better targeted than the EITC. By definition, the
employer-based wage subsidy recipients are members of groups at risk for long-term labor force
detachment.
With respect to distributional impacts, the TJTC was found to have a positive effect on
employment among the targeted groups. Using a statutory change in the TJTC that lowered the
maximum age for eligible youths, Katz (1996) shows that the TJTC had a modest effect on
employment for disadvantaged youths. This result is generally consistent with earlier research and
suggests that, like the EITC, employer-based subsidies have the ability to increase labor supply on
the extensive margin

Wage Subsidies in Welfare-to-Work Programs.

Welfare reform initiatives

often include wage subsidies. States practice “grant diversion,” in which they subsidize
employers who hire welfare recipients with funds otherwise used for welfare benefits (Temporary

Aid to Needy Families [TANF] and Food Stamps). Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri,
Oregon, and North Carolina all have these policies. These subsidies are time-limited and often
have strict requirements about minimum employment lengths. The targeted individuals are often
individuals in areas with particularly high unemployment rates or those who have not found
unsubsidized work after a period of time. In addition, the wage subsidies are part of a larger
package of job search services that often include child care and job training.
The 21st Century Communities Program in Kansas City, Missouri includes an employerbased wage subsidy that has received national attention. Participation is mandatory for welfare
recipients in the targeted regions of Kansas City. Like the state programs, the wage subsidy is
funded with TANF and Food Stamp benefits.
These programs are still too new to conduct a thorough evaluation. However, an informal
phone survey of program administrators suggests that the programs are not highly utilized. An
administrator from the Minnesota Family Investment Plan (MFIP) said few counties
implemented grant diversion programs and, of the 39,700 participants in the MFIP, only 20
participate in grant diversion. Administrators from the Florida and Georgia programs both
acknowledged that the participant levels in grant diversion are very low. It is possible that
stigma, participation costs, or lack of information are responsible for these low take-up rates.
Katz (1996) suggests that in the past wage subsidies through welfare-to-work programs
have been the most successful of the employer-based targeted wage subsidies. One reason may
be their combination of the wage subsidies with additional support services and subsidies. The
National Supported Work Demonstration in the 1970s, for example, was found to increase the
earnings of randomly assigned participants by over 20 percent in the two years following the end
of the program. These broad packages of services and subsidies also complicate an evaluation of
the wage subsidy in isolation.

4.

Lessons for Policy Design

The goal of this paper is to provide an analytical framework within which to compare
employee based wage subsidies and employer based wage subsidies. Only in the most basic
setting are the two approaches equivalent. In practice, wage subsidies paid to low-wage workers
do not necessarily reach low-skilled workers or poor households. Therefore, to achieve
distributional objectives using a wage subsidy to the employers the program must be very highly
targeted. This restriction leads to stigmatization of the potential employees and results in a
program that reaches a very low percentage of eligible individuals. Although participation rates
are very low, empirical evidence from previous employer based wage subsidies suggests that
these subsidies do have the potential to raise the employment levels of the targeted groups.
Unfortunately, low participation implies that the size of an employer-based subsidy must be quite
large in order to be equivalent to an employer-based approach.
Wage subsidies paid to employees do not require the same strict targeting. For example,
the income tax system is a mechanism for identifying low-income families. The EITC is
available to all families with income below a given level and the participation rate in the EITC is
very high. The more universal coverage of the employee-based wage subsidy comes at the cost
of being less well targeted than an employer based wage subsidy. To minimize labor force
disincentives, many nonpoor families receive the employee based wage subsidies.
However, existing empirical evidence suggests that the EITC has had widespread success
at raising the labor force participation rate of many primary earners, including single mothers.
We doubt that an employer-based subsidy could overcome the barriers it creates to reach a
similar magnitude.
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1.

See, also, Lerman (1982) for an excellent discussion of these issues.

2.

See Blinder and Rosen (1985) for an early discussion of how “notches” or non-linearities
may dominate program design when evaluated from a “bang for the buck” viewpoint
rather than a utility perspective.

3.

The SIPP surveys households every 4 months. We base our statistics on household
composition in December of 1994 and use the household head in that month to aggregate
over a year. The household information is based on the information reported by the head.
We, therefore, drop households whose heads were not in the sample for the entire year
(approximately 20 percent of the sample) because the annual income variables would be
incomplete. We only include individuals in the summary statistics if they are present for
the entire year when we calculate summary statistics for individuals. Additionally, we
drop approximately 200 persons because they do not accurately match up with a
household head or because they are in a household that reports negative pre-transfer
income. Finally, we exclude self-employed individuals from the individual statistics due
to the difficulty of measuring wages.

4.

We use point-in-time measures of wages to be consistent with other data sets like the
Current Population Survey. For individuals who do not report a wage, we calculate their
wage as monthly hourly earnings. The results are similar when we use average annual
wage. We define workers in our sample as individuals who report positive hours and
earnings.

5.

This has also been the topic of recent minimum wage discussions including Burkhauser
et. al. (1996) and Neumark et. al. (1998).

6.

Of course, “firms” are not the ultimate beneficiaries as all economic value must accrue to
either customers, workers, or owners.

7.

This ignores the issues in employees’ valuation of non-cash benefits. That is, we ignore
the overprovision of benefits that would lead employees to value them at below their
market price.

8.

Figure 2 makes no distinction between the intensive and extensive margin; this is,
between the number of low-wage workers and the hours of work for each. As an

empirical matter, we anticipate that the supply elasticity largely reflects the extensive
margin and focus the development on the decision to work rather than the allocation of
hours of work. Thus, it is probably best to think of w as the annual wage and c as the rate
of subsidy per worker.
9.

In the Harberger model, aggregate low-skill labor is fixed in total supply. In our setting,
it is likely to be somewhat elastically supplied, however, it is the aggregate elasticity (not
any sector-specific elasticity) that is relevant for computing the net economic benefit to
workers.

10.

See Katz (1996) for a thorough survey of former United States employer-based wage
subsidies.

11.

See Robertson, Heather (1994), D.H. Greenberg, and P.K. Robins, D.H. Greenberg, D.R.
Meyer, C. Michalopoulos and P.K. Robins, D.A. Green and W.C. Riddell, Card and
Robins, the New Deal program in the United Kingdom. http://www.newdeal.gov.uk/
homesub3.asp.

12.

Employees have the option to receive the EITC with their paychecks. According to the
General Accounting Office (1992), only 0.5 percent of EITC recipients get the credit in
advance.

13.

Noncompliance has been a large concern with the EITC. Scholz (1994) estimates that 30
percent of the EITC claimants were ineligible in 1988. The General Accounting Office
(1997) reports that in 1994, of the $17.2 billion in EITC claims, $4.4 billion was
overclaimed.

14

Liebman (1998) cites two sources that suggest that the administration cost of the EITC .
are also very low; between 1 and 3 percent of benefits paid (compared to 16 percent for
AFDC).

15

Participants are encouraged to apply for the federal and state EITCs.

Table 1.

Percent Poor

Descriptive Statistics for Poor and Low-Wage Households
Low-Wagea
(n = 2,847)
Standard
Mean
Deviation
15.0
35.7

Poor
(n = 1,716)
Standard
Mean
Deviation
100.0
0

Earningsb

$32,189

26,903

$2,823

4,762

Pre-Transfer Income

$37,650

27,081

$5,654

4,755

Post-Transfer Income

$38,121

26,788

$7,947

4,754

Poverty Gap

-$23,954

26,195

$5,925

5,023

Number of People

3.5

1.6

2.7

1.9

Number of Children

1.1

1.3

1.1

1.5

Number of Workers

2.1

1.0

0.5

0.7

23.0
42.1
Percent Headed by Single
9.6
29.5
Mother
43.7
Percent Headed by
46.6
25.7
68.2
Married Couple
a
We define a low-wage worker as someone whose average annual wage is below $5.93, which
marks the lowest quintile of the wage distribution
b
All income and earnings amount are based on annual 1994.
Source: 1993 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, individuals age 14 years
or older. All calculations use SIPP sample weights.

Table 2.

Descriptive Statistics for Poor and Low-Wage Individuals

Non-Working Poor
Low-Skilled Workersb
Low-Wage Workers
Poor Workersa
(n = 3,408)
(n = 740)
(n = 1,902)
(n = 2,677)
Standard
Standard
Standard
Standard
Mean
Deviation
Mean
Deviation
Mean
Deviation
Mean
Deviation
Percent Poor
15.3
36.0
100.0
0
100.0
0
11.3
37.2
Wage
$4.32
1.41
$6.00
3.68
0
0
$7.86
11.03
972
704
1,005
686
0
0
1,250
766
Hours Workeda
Earnings
$4,424
3,668
$6,197
5,694
0
0
$10,985
10,362
Pre-Transfer Income
$6,028
5,639
$6,994
5,737
$2,342
3,141
$12,194
10,915
Post-Transfer Income
$6,208
5,618
$7,612
5,615
$4,174
3,473
$12,299
10,870
% Receive Transfers
6.7
25.0
19.9
39.9
42.8
49.5
3.9
19.4
Hhld Pre-Transfer Inc.
$38,384
27,102
$9,431
5,541
$5,725
5,122
$38,163
24,122
Poverty Gap
-$24,197
26,239
$5,480
4442
$6,969
5711
-$23,960
23,371
Percent Disabled
10.7
30.9
13.3
33.9
27.9
44.8
10.0
30.0
Percent Teenagers
28.7
45.2
10.7
30.9
13.4
34.1
30.1
45.9
Percent Elderly
7.1
25.7
2.0
14.1
33.4
47.2
7.9
26.9
Percent White
82.5
38.0
67.9
46.7
65.5
47.5
82.8
37.8
Percent Female
62.4
48.4
57.3
49.5
67.8
46.7
41.6
49.3
Percent Single Mothers
19.2
39.4
26.7
44.2
19.1
39.4
15.6
36.3
Percent Single Men
13.8
34.5
11.6
32.0
13.4
34.1
14.5
35.2
Percent Single Women
14.7
35.4
11.5
32.0
28.4
45.1
8.3
27.6
Percent Married w/Kids
20.6
40.4
33.6
47.3
15.2
35.9
24.6
43.1
Percent Married w/o Kids
13.5
34.2
3.6
18.7
10.9
31.1
18.4
38.7
Percent Married
34.1
47.4
37.3
48.4
26.0
43.9
43.0
49.5
Age
31.7
15.7
33.9
12.1
47.8
22.1
35.3
16.8
11.5
2.6
11.2
2.9
9.8
3.2
8.9
2.5
Education
We
define
a
low-wage
worker
as
someone
whose
average
annual
wage
is
below
$5.93,
which
marks
the
lowest
quintile
of
the
wage
distribution
a
b All calculations use SIPP sample weights. All income, earnings and hours are annual 1994.
Source: 1993 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, individuals age 14 years or older, except self-employed individuals.

Program

Employee-Based Subsidies
Subsidy
Compliance
Rate
Requirement
No children: 7.65% of earnings
Personal Income
between$0 and $4,450; maximum of
Tax; Must report
$341; phased out at 7.65% for income child’s social
between $5,600 and $10,000.
security number
One child: 34% of earnings between
$0 and $6,650; maximum of $2,271;
phased out at 15.98% for income
between $12,300 and $26,450. Two
children: 40% of earnings between $0
and $9,350; maximum of $3,756;
phased out at 21.06% for income
between $12,300 and $30,095.
6.5% of federal EITC
Personal Income
Tax
10% of federal EITC
Personal Income
Tax
10% of federal EITC
Personal Income
Tax
50% of federal EITC with children,
Personal Income
otherwise 10%
Tax

Federal Earned
Income Tax Credit
(EITC)

Target
Group
Low income households
with earnings; available to
childless individuals only
if between the ages of 25
and 65

Iowa EITC

Same as federal

Kansas EITC

Same as federal

Massachusetts EITC

Same as federal

Maryland EITC

Same as federal

Minnesota EITC

Same as federal

25% of federal EITC with children,
otherwise 15%

Personal Income
Tax

New York EITC

Same as federal

20% of federal EITC

Oregon EITC

Same as federal

5% of federal EITC

Rhode Island EITC

Same as federal

27% of federal EITC

Vermont EITC

Same as federal

25% of federal EITC

Personal Income
Tax
Personal Income
Tax
Personal Income
Tax
Personal Income
Tax

Other
Notes
Refundable credit; paid
as a lump sum

Time
Limit
None

Nonrefundable credit

None

Refundable credit; paid
as lump sum
Refundable credit; paid
as lump sum
Refundable credit with
children, otherwise
nonrefundable; paid as
lump sum
Refundable credit; paid
as lump sum

None
None
None

None

Refundable credit; paid
as lump sum
Nonrefundable credit

None
None

Nonrefundable credit

None

Refundable credit; paid
as lump sum

None

Program
Wisconsin EITC

Target
Group
Same as federal

New Hope Project

Residents in targeted
Milwaukee neighborhoods
with income below 150%
of poverty line and willing
to work 30 hours per week

Federal Work
Opportunity Tax
Credit

(1) Individuals who live in
a family that received
AFDC/TANF in 9 of the
18 months before the hire,
(2) 18-24 year olds or
veterans in families
receiving food stamps, (3)
SSI recipients, (4) Exfelons and several other atrisk groups
Long-Term Welfare
Recipients: (1) Individuals
who have received
AFDC/TANF for at least
18 consecutive months
prior to hire or received
AFDC for any 18 months
after August5, 1997 and
(2) Individuals ineligible
for assistance because
welfare time limits are
binding.

Federal Welfare to
Work Tax Credit

Employer-Based Subsidies
Subsidy
Compliance
Rate
Requirement
4% of federal EITC w/ 1 child
Personal Income
14% w/2 children
Tax
43% w/3+ children
Provides a monthly earnings subsidy
to bring participants’ earnings to
poverty line

Federal Tax Credits
40% of qualified wages up to $6,000
for employees who work at least 400
hours; 25% for employees who work
between 120 and 400 hours. (for
employees hired between September
30, 1997 and July 1, 1998)

35% of qualified wage up to $10,000
for the first year of employment and
50% of qualified wage for the second
year

Other
Notes
Refundable credit; paid
as lump sum; not
available to childless
individuals
Also subsidizes child
care and health
insurance for
participants and
provides job search
services

Time
Limit
None

None

Employers must
certify eligibility
of the employee
by the day the
employee begins
work or the 21st
day after the
individual begins
work.

Employers cannot claim
both the Work
Opportunity Tax Credit
and the Welfare to
Work Tax Credit for an
employee.

One year

Employers must
certify eligibility
of the employee
by the day the
employee begins
work or the 21st
day after the
individual begins
work.

Employers cannot claim
both the Work
Opportunity Tax Credit
and the Welfare to
Work Tax Credit for an
employee.

Two years

An employer can claim
this credit only if the
employee worked at
least 180 days or 400
hours.

Program

Target
Group

District of Columbia
Employment Tax
Credit

D.C. residents working for
employers located in D.C.
Enterprise Zones

Maryland

Individuals who have
received AFDC/TANF
benefits in the 3 months
before hire

Massachusetts Full
Employment Credit

Employees previously
covered by Full
Employment Subsidy
Program

Missouri Enterprise
Zone Tax Credit

Individuals unemployed
for at least 90 days or
eligible for AFDC or
General Relief

Employer-Based Subsidies
Subsidy
Compliance
Rate
Requirement
State Tax Credits
The lesser of $3,000 or 20% of the
One form to be
first $15,000 in wages
included with
annual federal tax
filing
30% of first $6,000 of wages in first
(1) Job seeker or
year; 20% of first $6,000 of wages in
employer must
second year; 10% of first $6,000 of
obtain
wages in third year.
certification
voucher at time of
application and
(2) employer must
notify state at time
of hire
$100 per month of employment for
eligible employees

$400 credit for each new employee
trained

Employers must
complete a
substantial amount
of paperwork to
become involved
in the Enterprise
Zone Program

Other
Notes

Time
Limit

Credit is available for
new hires and existing
employees

Five years

Also provides a credit
for child care and
transportation expenses
of employee; employee
must work at least 1
year; employer cannot
receive any other
federal or state credit
for the employee
Eligibility of both
employees and
employers certified
through the Dept. of
Transitional Assistance
Employer must be
located in one of 62
designated enterprise
zones (employees do
not have to be residents
of these zones);they
also must provide
training

Three years

Up to ten years

Pennsylvania
Employee Incentive
Program

Individuals receiving
welfare cash assistance at
the time of hire

30% of first $6,000 of wages in first
year; 20% of first $6,000 of wages in
second year; 10% of first $6,000 of
wages in third year.

Rhode Island
New Employment
Tax Credit

Individuals unemployed
for at least 26 months and
received UI; recipients of
AFDC/TANF in 1 year
preceding hire

One-time credit of $2,400 per
employee

Employer must
obtain state
certification
within 30 days of
hire

Rhode Island
Jobs Training
Tax Credit

No specific target group;
aim of the program is to
“encourage all Rhode
Island businesses to
upgrade the skills of their
workforce”

Credit of up to $5,000 per employee
over a three year period (only $1,000
may cover wage costs; the rest is to
subsidize training)

Employer must
have training
program certified
by state, begin
program within 6
months of
approval, and file
for credit with
state income tax

South Carolina
(Family Independence
Act of 1995)

Individuals who have
received AFDC/TANF
within past 12 months

25% of wages up to maximum
payment of $5,000 in first year; 15%
of wages up to maximum payment of
$5,000 in second year; 10% of wages
up to maximum payment of $5,000 in
third year.

Also special credits (up
to $3,000/yr) for
employers in
Philadelphia
Empowerment Zones

Three years

One year

Employees cannot earn
more than $80,000/yr,
must work at least 30
hrs/wk, and must earn
over 150% of the
Rhode island minimum
wage after training.
Employees must be
retained for 18 months
after completing
training.

Three years

Three years

Program

Target
Group

Detroit
(Public/Private
Service Employment
Program)
Florida
(WAGES)

Hard-to-employ welfare
recipients

Georgia
(Work First!)

Welfare recipients,
especially those receiving
assistance for 30+ months

Minnesota (Family
Investment Plan)

Welfare recipients

Recipients of Temporary
Family Assistance

Employer-Based Subsidies
Subsidy
Compliance
Rate
Requirement
State Welfare Reform Programs
Full cost of wages is subsidized
Employer must
($6-8/hr)
agree to retain
employee for 1
year after subsidy
“Work Supplementation” program:
For each month of
pays value of employee’s temporary
payment received,
cash assistance benefits to employer
employer must
to subsidize wages
prove to state
agency that
additional subsidy
is needed to cover
employee’s onthe-job-training
Pays value of employee’s TANF
Employer must
benefits (state average: $238) to
agree to retain the
employer to subsidize wages each
employee after the
month
subsidy ends
Work Supplementation is an option
for counties to implement; employee
welfare benefits would be paid to
employers to subsidize wages

Other
Notes

Time
Limit

Participants are placed
in both private sector
and public agencies

Up to six months

Job must be full-time
(32-40 hrs/wk), pay
more than minimum
wage and employee
must be employed for
1 year. Employers
may also be eligible
for sales and corporate
tax credits.
Only available for new
positions; employers
can also receive
credits for training and
child care provided.
Also a youth wage
subsidy for 16-21
year-olds.

Up to six months

Nine months

Mississippi
(Work First
Demonstration)

Work-ready TANF and
Food Stamps recipients in
one of five pilot counties

Subsidy paid to employer paid from
TANF/FS fund; $3.25/hr in first
month and $2.35/hr for next five
months (Employee-based component:
employees are guaranteed difference
between welfare benefits and
earnings)

Mississippi
Employment
Security
Commission
oversees program,
recruits businesses
to enroll

Missouri (Wage
Supplementation
Program)

Welfare recipients

Pays average state value of TANF/FS
benefits to employer to be used as
wage subsidy; full value of welfare
payment must be put toward wages;
employees are guaranteed to receive
in earnings at least the amount they
would have received in benefits

State first screens
and then contracts
with accepted
employers;
participating
employers report
back (and are
paid) every month

Employers must also
contribute $1/hr (up to
$1,000 cap) to
employee’s Individual
Development Account;
employers must
provide
training/mentoring;
employers cannot use
WorkFirst hires to
replace existing
workers.
Day care and health
care assistance also
available; subsidized
positions cannot be
used to displace
current workers; pay
must be at or above
current level for nonsubsidized jobs.

Six months

Up to twelve
months.

Oregon
(JOBS Plus)

Food stamps, AFDC, and
unemployment insurance
recipients who have failed
to find unsubsidized
employment

Fully reimburses firms for wages,
social security, unemployment
insurance, and worker’s compensation
for hiring targeted employees.
(Employee based component:
employees are guaranteed the
difference between welfare benefits
and earnings)

Employers must
submit monthly
updates on hours
worked by
participants and
they receive
reimbursement
within 5 days.

North Carolina
(Work Over Welfare)

Welfare recipients in
counties with high
unemployment rates

Employers receive wage subsidies
through TANF/Food Stamps fund.

Participants must
sign agreement of
training and
employment
responsibility.

21st Century
Communities
Program in
Kansas City, Missouri

Welfare recipients in the
targeted regions of Kansas
City

Wage supplements paid to employers
who create jobs in low-income
neighborhoods.

Extends Medicaid
benefits for working
participants and
subsidizes child care
and other work
expenses; after 30 days
the employer must
contribute $1/hr to
Individual Education
Account; employer
must provide on-thejob training and
mentoring.
Participants may be
required to spend up to
40 hrs/wk in JOBS
activities like job
search or subsidized
employment.
Participation is
mandatory; includes
child care and health
care benefits for a
limited time.

Six months

Two year
demonstration
waiver approved
in March 1996.

Four years
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